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The Courts or Courts-Martial: What Is The Proper Venue For Trying "Accompanying" 
and "In the Field" Civilian Contractors? 
Matt Engel' 
I. Introduction 
In December 2007, Ala Mohammed Ali, a dual citizen of Canada and Iraq, signed a 
contract with L3 Communications to provide language services to the United States Army 
Intelligence and Security Command in Iraq. 1 In early 2008, Ali was deployed to Hit, Iraq, to 
serve as a language interpreter with the lst Squad, 3rd Platoon, !70th Military Police Company.Z 
Ali's job as an interpreter was to accompany the 1st Squad on missions and to be the 
communicative middleman between the Squad and the Iraqi police.3 Ali wore the uniform of a 
soldier, but did not carry a weapon.4 At one point Ali lived with the Squad itself although, when 
the Squad was moved, he resided with other interpreters. 5 Ali's supervisor, in terms of his 
employment, was the L3 Site Manager, who operated in AI Asad, Iraq.6 Nonetheless, the record 
shows that in practice, Ali reported to one Staff Sargent Butler, the 1st Squad Leader.7 Ali was 
unquestionably a civilian, as he was serving neither as an American nor as an Iraqi military 
member. But as can be seen from the above facts, he was highly integrated in both his dress and 
supervision, blurring the distinction between serving in a civilian and military capacity. 
In February of 2008, not long after his initial deployment, Ali was involved tn an 
altercation with another Iraqi interpreter, Al-Umarryi. 8 Though the confrontation started as 
'J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Connecticut College, 2008. 
1 United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256,259 (C.A.A.F. 2012) reconsideration denied, 12-0008/AR, 2012 WL 3966727 
(C.A.A.F. Aug. 31, 2012). 
2 /d. 
3 /d 
4/d. 
5 /d. 
6 Ali, 71 M.J.at259. 
7 !d. 
8 
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merely verbal, it escalated when Al-Umarryi struck Ali in the head.9 Ali was instructed to wait 
in Butler's room until the Squad Leader retumed. 1° From Butler, he stole a knife, which he later 
used to attack Al-Umarryi, who ended up with four lacerations to his chest. 11 Consequently, Ali 
was placed on "restricted liberty," required not to leave the military base, and to check in with 
L3 twice daily, a condition he violated when he travelled to AI, Asad, shortly thereafter. 12 Ali 
was placed in pre-trial confinement, charged with assaulting Al-Umarryi, violating his restricted 
liberty instruction, and was referred to a court-martial--established by the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (herein "UCMJ")-where he was convicted. 13 
Not long after the incidents involving Ali in Iraq took place, a similar series of events 
occurred at the Kandahar Airfield (herein "KAF"), in Kandahar, Afghanistan. KAF was the 
place of employment for Sean Brehm, a South African citizen. 14 In July 20 I 0, Brehm signed an 
employment contract with DynCorp International LLC, an American-based security contractor 
that operated in Afghanistan. 15 Brehm's primary responsibility was to make and coordinate 
travel arrangements for other contractors. 16 On November 25, 2010, a contractor, J.O., with 
whom Brehm had a previous dispute, was returning to KAF. 17 Brehm engaged him at the 
airport, and similar to what occurred between Ali and Al-Umarryi, a verbal argument turned 
physical and ended with Brehm stabbing J.0. 18 Brehm was arrested, charged pursuant to the 
9 !d. 
10 !d. 
II /d. 
12 Ali, 71 M.J. at 260. 
13 /d. 
14 United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 549 (4th Cir. 2012). 
15 !d. 
16 !d. 
17 !d. 
18 !d. 
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Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (herein "MEJA"), and extradited to the United States for 
trial in the Eastern District of Virginia. 19 
Though certain factual distinctions between any two cases are unavoidable, and these two 
are no different, their similarities are also undeniable-from the alleged criminals' employment 
as contractors, to the locus of the crimes and the types of crimes committed. Nonetheless, two 
very different legal mechanisms were used to adjudicate these two cases. Ali was prosecuted 
using a relatively new conception of the American court-martial system, which until 2006, 
traditionally had been used to try civilians only "in a time of declared war."20 Indeed, in 1970, 
the U.S. Court of Military Appeals held that a civilian contractor accused of criminal activity in 
Vietnam could not be court-martialed because the conflict was not a Congressionally declared 
War, such as World War JI?1 Prosecuting civilians by court-martial, then, became something of 
an exercise in futility because of the infrequency with which the United States Congress declares 
wars.22 
In response to the increase in criminal abuses committed by civilian contractors serving 
with the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, Senator Lindsey Graham sought to amend the UCMJ 
to allow for the court-martial to be used more easily against offending civilians.23 In 2006, he 
succeeded and the language of UCMJ 2(a)(IO) providing for court-martial jurisdiction over 
civilians was substantially broadened (this legislation will herein be referred to as the "Graham 
19 !d. at 549-550. 
20 Brittany Warren, If You Have A Zero-Tolerance Policy, Why Aren't You Doing Anything?: Using the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice to Combat Human Trafficking Abroad, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1272 (2012). 
21 United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970). 
22 See Barbara Salazar Torreon, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21405, U.S. PERJODS OF WAR AND DATES OF CURRENT 
CONFLICT (20 II). 
23 See Warren, supra note 20, at 1272. 
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Amendment").24 The effect of the Graham Amendment was to eliminate the constraint that a 
Congressionally declared war was the only conflict an accompanying civilian could be court-
martialed during; instead, he or she could be court-martialed during any conflict the Secretary of 
Defense deemed appropriate and so named a "contingency operation."25 Accordingly, Ali could 
be court -martialed as a civilian only because of this amendment, since Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
the conflict during which Ali served, was not a declared war, but rather a contingency 
operation. 26 
Brehm on the other hand was not referred to a court-martial to be tried in a military court, 
presided over by a military judge, but to an Article III District Court, in Virginia, pursuant to 
MEJA. Though he pled guilty as a condition to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to 
dismiss, Brehm was afforded the right of a jury trial, a right Ali did not have under the court-
martial.27 Brehm was afforded the venue of a civilian court and the procedural benefits that 
come with it because of MEJA. Like the Graham Amendment, MEJA was passed to provide 
American jurisdiction over civilians working for the United States military abroad.28 Unlike the 
Graham Amendment, it sought to close the 'jurisdictional gap"29 while retaining the core due 
process protections to the accused offered by the American criminal justice system. 
The Ali and Brehm cases show that similar cases can be adjudicated to substantially 
similar results, but may arrive at those results in very different ways. This Comment will explore 
24 Paragraph (10) of section 802(a) of title 10, United States Code (article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice), is amended by striking "war" and inserting "declared war or a contingency operation." H.R. REP. No. 109-
702, at 137 (2006). 
25 A "contingency operation" is defmed as "a military operation that is (A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense 
as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, 
or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force." lO U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
26 Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in Afghanistan, and Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operation New 
Dawn in Iraq are all clearly contingency operations according to this statutory defmition. 
27 Brehm, 691 F.3d at 550. 
28 H.R. REP. 106-778 at 4 (2000). (The 'jurisdictional gap" refers to the problem that occurs when no law or a law's 
failure ''allows . .. crimes to go unpunished.") 
29 !d. 
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both routes in an attempt to determine which is best suited to prosecute offenses, while 
simultaneously best honoring the United States Constitution, the Constitution's values, and the 
Supreme and appellate court precedent that has interpreted them. It will argue, and ultimately 
conclude, that MEJA, though flawed and in need of reform and revision to achieve its 
prosecutorial potential, is the substantially more constitutionally-sound approach to prosecuting 
civilians accompanying or employed by the United States Military abroad. While MEJA 
currently leaves much to be desired in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness, it could be easily 
amended to encourage Federal prosecutors to use it more frequently. Moreover, the Civilian 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (herein "CEJA") should be passed to complement MEJA, which 
would expand the scope of civilians working with the military who come under Article III court 
jurisdiction. 
The Comment will also argue that the Graham Amendment, in its current form, is 
unconstitutional. Not only does it break with a long line of Supreme Court precedent that 
restricts the use of court-martials to try civilians, but it also implicates Congress in passing a law 
that it may not have had authority to pass in the first place given its restricted rulemaking power. 
The Comment will acknowledge these deficiencies and offer some practical solutions, including 
a "totality of the circumstances" test that the courts should adopt to ensure the Graham 
Amendment is not used in a fashion that contravenes the values of the Constitution, and applied 
only in the few circumstances where MEJA and CEJA are inapplicable. 
The Comment will be structured as follows: Part II provides a historical overview of 
military justice in the United States, particularly jurisdiction over civilians, in both peacetime 
and wartime, and both before and after the codification of the UCMJ. Part III explains how the 
increasing use of civilian contractors and the ensuing "jurisdictional gap" led Congress to create 
5 
MEJA and the Graham Amendment, two competing, concurrent schemes to bring these civilians 
under American jurisdiction, and delve into the substance of these schemes. Part IV of the 
Comment analyzes how the Ali and Brehm cases are illustrative of both the problems and 
benefits associated with each of the two legislative schemes. Part V of the Comment argues for 
enhancing the Justice Department's ability to use MEJA/CEJA with more frequency and to 
greater prosecutorial effect, while also suggesting a judicially-formed standard to limit the use of 
the Graham Amendment exclusively to situations when it is absolutely necessary. Part VI 
summarizes the issues and concludes. 
II. Civilian Court and Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or 
Accompanying The Military In Times of Peace and War 
A. The Early Years.· The U CMJ and the Early "Peace-Time" Cases 
The American military's jurisdiction over civilians can be traced to 1775 when the 
Provisional Congress of Massachusetts Bay codified the Massachusetts Articles of War, which 
allowed for "all persons whatsoever serving with the Massachusetts Army," solders or otherwise 
to be subject to the Articles?0 After the First Continental Congress, the American Articles of 
War made the same provision uniform for the fledgling American nation.31 Shortly thereafter, 
Cungr~ss was authorized iu creaie laws regulating ihe military pursuant iu ihe power granted by 
Article I of the Constitution.32 For 150 years, the manifestation of these regulations was the 
Articles of War for the Army and Articles for the Government of the Navy for the Navy and 
Marine Corps.33 
30 See Anna Manasco Dionne, "In Time of Whenever the Secretary Says": The Constitutional Case Against Court-
Martial Jurisdiction over Accompanying Civilians During Contingency Operations, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 205, 
216 (2008), citing William B. Aycock & Seymour W. Wurfel, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF 
MILITARY JUSTICE 9 (1955), and William Winthrop, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 97-100 (2d ed. 1920). 
31 See AMERICAN ARTICLES OF W AROF 1775, art. XXXII, reprinted in WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND 
PRECEDENTS, 953-956. 
32 U.S. CONST. Art. !. 
33 !d. 
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During this time, the Supreme Court frowned upon the use of the court-martial to 
prosecute civilians. In Ex parte Milligan, the Court held that the trying nature of the times (i.e., 
the Civil War) could not provide a legal rationale for the denial of a civilian's constitutionally 
protected right to a trial by jury, stating, "[n]o doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, 
was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any 
of the great exigencies of govemment."34 The Court went on to find that the government could 
not deny Milligan his trial by jury when a civilian court in his home state of Indiana was 
functioning and capable of adjudicating the same case.35 
Later on, and just before the advent of the UCMJ, the Court similarly held that military 
tribunals could not supplant the civilian courts when the latter were open for business. In 
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the Court found that Congress could not properly authorize the military 
to try civilians in military tribunals in Hawaii because of the attack on Pearl Harbor. 36 In finding 
the military tribunals unconstitutional, quoting Milligan, the Court held "civil liberty and this 
kind of martial law cannot endure together; the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, 
one or the other must perish."37 
Following World War II, due to the substantial growth of both the American Armed 
Forces and the corresponding increase in cases in which military justice was necessary to 
adjudicate crimes and claims, Congress passed and President Truman signed the UCMJ into law 
in 1950 to aggregate and systematize the legal scheme going forward. 38 Article 2(a)(l0) of the 
34 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121(1866). 
35 !d. at 122-123. 
36 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
37 Id at 324. 
38 See Dionne, supra note 30, at 217. 
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UCMJ provided the military with jurisdiction over civilians in a time of "declared war" so long 
as they were "serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field. "39 
Despite the language explicitly permitting court-martial jurisdiction over civilians in a 
specific circumstance, the Court continued to be circumspect about such use. In Toth v. Quarles, 
the seminal case on this issue, the Court disallowed the court -martial to try a service member 
who had been discharged and then accused of murder because at the time of the accusation, he 
was a civilian and no longer an active military member.40 In his opinion, Justice Black saw a 
great danger in using courts-martial to try civilians, stating: 
"(t]here are dangers lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by 
the Bill of Rights and Article III of our Constitution. Free countries of the world 
have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed 
absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service."41 
The Court then laid down what has become known as the Toth Doctrine, ruling that 
courts-martial should be "limit[ed] to 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."'42 
Thus, in writing the Toth opinion, the Court maintained the principles of Milligan and Duncan 
that sought to check the power of military justice to adjudicate claims over civilians. 
In its next term, the Court again prohibited the use of the court-martial to prosecute a 
civilian. In Reid v. Coveri, Clarice Coveri was accused uf rnunleri11g her hu;Sband, an active Air 
Force member, while they both resided at an American Air Force base in England.43 Though she 
was convicted by court-martial, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction for reasons similar 
to those in its recent opinion in Tot h. 44 The Court found incredulous the idea that the Framers 
would have permitted military jurisdiction over a civilian such as Covert, writing: 
39 I 0 U .S.C. § 802 (2006). 
40 U.S. ex. rei. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. II (1955). 
41 Id at 22. 
42 Id. 
43 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
44 ld. 
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"[t]he idea that the relatives of soldiers could be denied a jury trial in a court of 
law and instead be tried by court-martial under the guise of regulating the armed 
forces would have seemed incredible to those men, in whose lifetime the right of 
the military to try soldiers for any offenses in time of peace had only been 
grudgingly conceded."45 
It is useful to understand why the Court was so forceful in restricting courts-martials of 
civilians to the most exceptional circumstances, and Justice Black's language again proves 
instructive: 
"Courts-martial are typically ad hoc bodies appointed by a military officer from 
among his subordinates. They have always been subject to varying degrees of 
'command influence.' In essence, these tribunals are simply executive tribunals 
whose personnel are in the executive chain of command. Frequently, the 
members of the court-martial must look to the appointing officer for promotions, 
advantageous assignments and efficiency ratings-in short, for their future progress 
in the service. Conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and 
sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, the members of a 
court-martial, in the nature of things, do not and cannot have the independence of 
jurors drawn from the general public or of civilian judges."46 
Justice Black did, if albeit grudgingly, make a concession that in "extraordinary" war-
time circumstances, courts-martial of civilians may be allowed, so long as the accused was 
"serving in the field" as U.C.M.J. 2(a)(IO) specifies. 47 Nonetheless, Black found that the 
prosecution of Clarice Covert in 1950's Great Britain did not meet this contextual requirement, 
writing, "the exigencies which have required military rule on the battlefront are not present in 
areas where no conflict exists."48 So while Justice Black did strongly reaffirm the Toth Doctrine, 
he left the door open to Congress and the courts to utilize 2(a)(l0) for the strict use its plain 
language permitted. Shortly thereafter, the Court, for the first time, was confronted with a case 
involving the court-martial of civilian contractors working with the military. In McElroy v. US. 
Ex rei. Guagliardo, and no differently than in Toth and Covert, the Court found that in peacetime 
45 !d. at 23. 
46 !d. at 36 
47 !d. at 34 
48 fd. at 34--35. 
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the military could not use the court-martial to try a civilian, which contractors are despite their 
employment by the Armed Forces.49 
B. The "War-Time" Cases and Clarification of the 2(a)(JO) Language 
In short, there is no lack of Supreme Court precedent on how to interpret 2(a)(l0) in 
times of peace. The Court has made clear that using a court-martial to try a civilian is not 
constitutionally permissible in peacetime. But what about "wartime?" As noted earlier in this 
article, the lack of declared wars had left 2(a)(l 0) essentially inoperable since the very War (and 
last Congressionally declared one) that inspired its passage. Nonetheless, two cases have helped 
elucidate the meaning of the language as it pertains to wartime. 
US. v. Averette has proven the most instructive on defining the previously required "in a 
time of war" language of 2(a)(10). 50 In finding that Averette, a civilian, could not be tried by 
court-martial for conspiracy to commit larceny and attempted larceny, the Court of Military 
Appeals (herein "C.M.A. ") restricted its holding to deciding the exact meaning of the language at 
issue. 5 1 In determining that "in a time of war" referred only to declared wars, the C.M.A. went 
no further and did not profess an opinion on whether the court-martial of civilians in a time of 
war was constitutionally permissible. 52 However, it did cite Reid v. Covert for the proposition 
that Congress's war powers are considerably broader than its powers to regulate the armed 
forces, implying that in a time of war, the court-martial of civilians might be allowed. 53 
The courts have otherwise been relatively silent in exploring the meaning of the statutory 
language of 2(a)(10) as it applies to "wartime." One case, United States v. Burney, relied on by 
49 McElroy v. U.S. ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960). 
50 United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363 ( 1970). 
51 !d. at 366. 
52 !d. 
53 !d. at 364 ("The Supreme Court pointed out in Reid v Covert, supra, that the constitutional grants of legislative 
authority to the Congress, collectively referred to as the war powers, are considerably more extensive than the 
authority in Article I, section 8, clause 14, of the Constitution to prescribe rules for t.'1e government oft.lte armed 
forces standing alone."). 
10 
the majority opinion in Ali, stated that "in the field" refers to the "activity" a civilian is engaged 
in, not merely the location of where it occurs, and that the activity referred to in this sense is one 
that "impl[ies] military operations with a view to the enemy."54 Burney also states that "serving 
with" or "accompanying" the Armed Forces depends on whether a civilian's movement is not 
"incidental, but directly connected with, or dependent upon, the activities of the armed force or 
its personnel," implying that when the movement is superfluous to the activities of the army, the 
movement, would not meet the requirement of 2(a)(l 0). 55 Interestingly, and at odds with 
Averette, Burney states that "in the time of war," does not necessitate a formal declaration of war 
by Congress. 56 Instead, it states that the language refers to the "actualities of the situation. "57 
Given vagaries in the case law such and splits like those between Averette and Burney, 
what emerged was a developed, but now dated "peace-time" jurisprudence that has little 
immediately applicable value to the United States' current military involvement, and the ever-
increasing reliance on civilian contractors for a variety of purposes abroad. More recently, it 
became necessary to reevaluate the statutory scope of 2(a)(10). This reevaluation created two 
judicial schemes for dealing with the issue of civilians serving with the military abroad: the 
MEJA and the Graham Amendment. 
III. MEJA and the Graham Amendment: Two Competing, Concurrent Attempts to Assert Article 
III Court and Military Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilians Abroad 
Of the two schemes, MEJA was enacted first, in 2000. Its purpose, as stated, was to 
"establish Federal criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed outside the United States by 
persons employed by or accompanying the United States Armed Forces."58 The need for the 
54 United States v. Burney, 2! C.M.R. 98, I 09 (!956). 
55 !d. at !!0. 
56 !d. at !09. 
57 /d. 
58 H.R. REP. !06-778 at 4. 
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legislation arose from the aforementioned 'Jurisdictional gap": because the conflicts the United 
States is currently involved in are not congressionally declared wars, the UCMJ 2(a)(IO) could 
not be used. 59 Furthermore, even though host nations presumably have jurisdiction to try these 
civilians, Congress stated that they often failed to do so when the civilian was an American, or 
American property was implicated in the crime60 The House Judiciary Committee determined 
that such a jurisdictional gap "undermined deterrence and increased injustice."61 Thus, MEJA 
was established to provide jurisdiction over the more than 58,000 civilian employees working for 
the Department of Defense (herein "DoD").62 Not only does MEJA provide jurisdiction over 
these civilians, but it also provides the processes for implementation, including those regarding 
initial proceedings and eventual removal of a suspect. 63 The Judiciary Committee found the Act 
to be constitutional pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clauses 10, 14, 16, and 18 of the 
Constitution.64 MEJA went into effect in November 2000, but a review of cases citing to the 
statute reveals that it has been used infrequently.65 
MEJA's under-utilization follows for several reasons. Though it was changed in 2004, 
MEJA initially covered only civilians and contractors working with the DoD. 66 Many more 
work for other executive offices such as the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency 
("CIA"), and the Department of the Interior; none of these agencies fall under MEJA's 
purview. 67 Additionally, MEJA does not support jurisdiction over civilian host country 
59 !d. 
60 !d. 
61 !d. 
62 !d. 
63 18 u.s.c. § 3264, 3265 (2006). 
64 !d. 
65 18 u.s.c. § 3261 (2006). 
66 See Dionne, supra note 30, at 221-22. 
67 !d. 
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nationals.68 People like Ali cannot be prosecuted under MEJA because host country nationals 
(i.e., citizens of the country where the civilian is working, like Ali in Iraq) are excluded from 
MEJAjurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3267(l)(C).69 Lastly, MEJA has been underutilized because 
the Justice Department will not take any cases unless they receive referrals from the DoD.70 This 
is further complicated by the fact that the DoD has not shown great interest in referring cases 
involving civilians and civilian contractors to the Justice Department. 71 Essentially, because of 
problems not only with its statutory language, but also with its implementation, MEJA has failed 
to plug the jurisdictional gap that was the reason for its creation. 
It is in this context of MEJA under-utilization, the increasing use of civilians abroad for 
military operations, and of the number of incidents involving these civilian contractors in Iraq 
and Afghanistan,72 that the Graham Amendment was passed. As noted earlier in this article, the 
Graham Amendment changes the language of UCMJ Article 2(a)(l0) minimally. Nevertheless, 
that minimal change has spawned a potentially great effect; no longer is the court-martial for 
civilians restricted to use during formally declared wars. Court-martials can now be used to 
adjudicate crimes of civilians during all contingency operations. This means the military can 
assert court -martial jurisdiction over civilians as long as the Secretary Defense says it can. 73 
This expansive use of the court-martial in a time that is not a congressionally declared war is an 
explicitly stark departure from the string of cases that follow the Toth Doctrine. Implicitly, the 
Graham Amendment questions the civilian courts' ability to lead the way in civilian and civilian 
contractor jurisdiction. 
68 18 u.s.c. 3267(l)(C) (2006). 
69 !d. 
70 See Dionne, supra note 30, at 222. 
71 !d. at F.N. 93. 
72 See Moshe Schwartz, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40835, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S USE OF PRIVATE 
SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 
(2009) for a summary of major incidents and other background information. 
73 See Dionne, supra note 30, at 237. 
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This Comment will argue that such questioning is misplaced. It will acknowledge the 
failures ofMEJA, but also its recent success. The Comment will offer a way to revise it, both by 
amending the current legislation and by endorsing CEJA a scheme that can benefit MEJA by 
supplementing the existing statute. Finally, it will analyze the constitutionality of the Graham 
Amendment and conclude that in its current form, as applied, it is violative of the Toth Doctrine, 
a doctrine that is still good law and must be adhered to pursuant to respect for Supreme Court 
precedent and stare decisis. It will lastly propose a judicial doctrine that can interpret the 
Graham Amendment in a way that validates it under Toth and allows it to complement, rather 
than compete with MEJA, keeping the jurisdiction over civilians abroad, whenever possible, in 
the civilian courts, where it belongs. 
IV. The Practical and Constitutional Implications of Brehm and Ali With Regards to 
MEJA and the Graham Amendment 
The Brehm and Ali cases are illustrative of the practical potential for these respective 
statutory schemes: they show that it is possible to successfully adjudicate crimes committed by 
civilians serving with the armed forces abroad. Nonetheless, both cases also show how difficult 
these prosecutions can be in more murky factual situations. These cases were prosecuted 
successfuliy, the record shows, iikeiy because their reievant facts were so straightforward. in 
less cut and dried circumstances, it is unclear if both schemes would work as effectively, and 
indeed, scholarly literature on the subject shows ways in which both schemes might fail 
practically to adjudicate more complicated cases. 
Besides their practical and prosecutorial implications, the cases also reveal how each 
scheme might or might not fit within the Toth Doctrine. In short, as Brehm shows, MEJA 
provides a statutory scheme that will flourish in some cases (such as the instant one) but may 
struggle mightily to succeed in others. However, because ofMEJA's locus of adjudication in the 
14 
civilian court system, it is consistent with Toth, and seems to be constitutional botb facially and 
in cases like Brehm as applied. Conversely, as Ali shows, the Graham Amendment immediately 
affronts Toth and is constitutionally questionable in a way MEJA is not. 
A. The Case of Sean Brehm 
The facts surrounding Brehm made it ripe for adjudication under MEJA. First, Brehm's 
contract was with DynCorp, 74 who in turn had contracted with the DoD. 75 As a civilian 
employee of the DoD, Brehm fell firmly within MEJA's definition of who falls under its 
jurisdiction.76 As we will see below in Ali, it is not always that civilians do. Additionally, 
Brehm's alleged crime occurred at the KAF Airport in full view of an Army Criminal 
Investigation Division ("CID") agent. 77 The agent and two other contractors were able to 
intervene and stop the assault from continuing, before remanding Brehm into custody. 78 Given 
tbe CID agent's fortuitous intervention,79 it is possible he was able to expediently and accurately 
create a record of tbe incident that could be used in any investigation and the court case to 
follow. This is important, because one of tbe criticisms of MEJA has been that it is too difficult 
for the Justice Department-the agency tasked with prosecuting MEJA cases-to frequently 
prosecute MEJA cases due to the lack of referrals from the DoD.80 
These lack of referrals can be attributed to the DoD's lack of interest, or lack of time, and 
contribute directly to tbe dearth of prosecutions under tbe law.81 Due to tbe CID's intervention, 
74 United States v. Brehm, I :11-CR-11, 2011 WL 1226088 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011) affd, 691 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 
2012). 
75 !d. 
76 18 U.S.C. 3267 (2006). 
77 Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088 at *3. 
78 Id. 
79 !d. (He was only at the KAF Airport to pick up a witness to another case, independent of anything involving Sean 
Brehm). 
80 See Dionne, supra note 30, at 222. 
81 !d. (citing Glenn Schmitt, HOLD CONTRACTORS ACCOUNTABLE, Navy Times. com, http:// 
www.navytimes.com/community/opinion/army_ hacktalk _contractors_ 071126/ (Mar. 9, 2008) (explaining that 
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it is likely that the DoD had no option but to investigate and refer the case to the Justice 
Department for prosecution. Once that was done, the procedures ofMEJA seemed to have gone 
smoothly with a Magistrate Judge issuing an arrest warrant, then holding a telephonic 
conference, ordering extradition, and referring the case a to grand jury for indictment within a 
one month period.82 In short, given Brehm's status as an employee of DynCorp (and thus, the 
DoD), as well as the particular and somewhat serendipitous circumstances of the CID's presence 
during the crime, the case was workable within the context ofMEJA's practical underpinnings. 
Just as, if not more importantly, the case provides a convincing argument that MEJA is 
constitutionally permissible. And though, as noted above, the Toth Doctrine is not implicated by 
MEJA, such a novel statute requires at least some degree of constitutional review. Though not 
exhaustive, both the Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit have done a convincing 
job of refuting arguments that the scheme is unconstitutional as applied in certain factual 
contexts. The two constitutional challenges Brehm presented the court were that MEJA's 
provtswn violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, and that it exceeded 
Congress's enumerated powers. 83 
With regards to Brehm's due process challenge, generally the United States can enforce 
its laws beyond its territory. 84 The dispositive test to determine whether jurisdiction is proper 
under a specific law, and thus not offensive to Brehm's due process rights, is whether there is a 
"sufficient nexus" between him, his activities, and the United States. 85 Factors that determine 
"[t]he Defense Department's position is that it is too busy fighting the war to investigate the acts of contractors, even 
those who work directly for the military. And the Justice Department takes the position that it will prosecute only 
cases that the Defense Department refers to it.") 
82 Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088 at *4. 
83 !d. 
84 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991). 
85 See Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088 at *4 (citing Mohammad-Ornar, 323 F. App'x. at 261) (citing United States v. 
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, Ill (2d Cir. 2003)). 
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whether an actor outside of the territorial United States does have a sufficient nexus with the 
country are: 
"(I) the defendant's actual contacts with the United States, including his 
citizenship or residency; (2) the location of the acts allegedly giving rise to the 
alleged offense; (3) the intended effect a defendant's conduct has on or within the 
United States; and (4) the impact on significant United States interests."86 
If an actor's relationship with the United States is so contrived or tenuous as to make a 
legal proceeding "arbitrary or unfair," jurisdiction would not be proper. 87 
Between his employment by DynCorp and his access to KAF by virtue of his and 
DynCorp's relationship with the DoD-both of which led to the assault of his victim-Brehm 
established a "relationship" with the United States. 88 Furthermore, the court found that by 
harming another contractor, on an American Air Force base, and requiring the resources of both 
the CID and the American court system to adjudicate the alleged crime, Brehm's activities 
clearly established a sufficient nexus between him and the United States. 89 The importance of 
this determination cannot be understated. Whether the United States could establish facts to 
create a suilicient nexus between the country and the accused is a concern that's been raised by 
both the Department of Justice during the law's passage90 as well as attorneys working for the 
military directly.91 Here, the court articulately and cogently describes how Brehm, even though 
not a citizen of the United States, has more than sufficient contacts given his employment with 
DynCorp, and by proxy the DoD, and how his actions directly affect the interests and resources 
of the United States. 
86 !d. 
87 Id. 
88 Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088 at *5. 
89 Id. 
90 H.R. REP. 106-778, pt. I, n. 26 (prepared remarks ofDOJ attorney Roger Pauley). 
91 Andrew D. Fallon & Capt. Theresa A. Keene, Closing the Legal Loophole? Practical Implications of the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of2000, 51 A.F. L. REV. 271, 271 (2001). 
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Additionally, the Eastern District of Virginia persuasively argued that Congress's 
enactment of MEJA does not violate its enumerated powers as granted by the Constitution. 
Citing the seminal case, United States v. Curtis Wright and numerous cases that have followed it, 
the court ruled that Congress, pursuant to its powers granted by Article I, Section 1 of the 
Constitution had the power to enact MEJA.92 As the court points out, powers reserved to the 
states by the Constitution, do not include the right to enforce the Federal penal code 
extraterritorially.93 Because this was a power never granted to the states, it falls firmly within 
those "necessary and proper" for the Federal government to exercise. 94 Though the Fourth 
Circuit agreed ultimately with the District Court's ruling, specifically with regards to the 
"sufficient nexus" of Brehm's actions and the United States, the court did not MEJA's 
constitutionality in Section 1 of Article 1 of the Constitution.95 Instead, it found MEJA as valid 
under Article 1, Section 8 Clauses 12 and 18.96 These clauses provide Congress not only the 
directive to "raise and support Armies," but also the mandate to make any laws necessary and 
proper to their maintenance.97 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found MEJA fell within Congress's right 
and was constitutional as applied to Brehm, who did not challenge the law facially on appeal.98 
Both the District Court and the Circuit Court decisions make clear that MEJ A can serve 
an effective purpose to prosecuting crime-committing civilian contractors serving with the 
military abroad, given the right circumstances. Here, because of the simplicity of Brehm's 
crime, he was expeditiously stopped, investigated, and brought to the United States to face trial. 
More importantly, both the District Court and the Fourth Circuit dealt convincingly with the 
92 Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088 at *6 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 
(1936); United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir .2000)). 
93 !d. at *6. 
94 !d. 
95 Brehm, 691 F.3d at 551 (4th Cir. 2012). 
96 !d. 
97 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 12; cl. 18. 
98 Brehm, 691 F.3d at 551. 
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constitutional problems and found MEJA well within Congress's legal abilities. In short, Brehm 
provides a practical and procedural template for how to use MEJA legally and to its intended 
effect. Nonetheless, as analysis of Ali below will show that problems with the law exist and 
make the utilization of courts-martial appealing in ways that MEJA is not. 
B. The Case of Ala Mohammed Ali 
Unlike Sean Brehm, Ala Ali had no chance at all to be adjudicated under MEJA. 
Because Ali was an Iraqi national, MEJA has no jurisdiction over him.99 Without the Graham 
Amendment to UCMJ Article 2(a)(10), there would be no way for the United States to adjudicate 
the crime Ali was accused of. 100 So from a practical perspective, the Graham Amendment was 
necessary to trying Ali. Unfortunately, because of the relatively ad hoc nature of the court-
martial process, the appellate cases, and not the actual court-martial, has been reported. 101 All 
that can be told from the record is that the crime was committed in February 2008, and that in 
June of 2008, sometime after Ali's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was dismissed, Ali 
was charged with additional crimes. 102 Sometime between June of2008 and July 18, 2011, when 
Ali's appeal to the motion to dismiss was heard, he was court-martialed and ordered to serve five 
months confinement. 103 Though the majority opinion of the C.A.A.F. references the opinion of 
this proceeding and the opinion of the military judge, no citation is provided. 104 
In short, while there is ample record of the appellate process on Ali's motion to dismiss, 
and the reasons for its denial, there is no record available to the public of the actual court-martial. 
99 United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. at 270; 18 U.S.C. 3267 (1996). 
100 See Steve Vladeck, ANALYSIS OF U.S. V. ALI: A FLAWED MAJORITY, CONFLICTING CONCURRENCES, AND THE 
FUTURE OF MILITARY JURISDICTION, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/analysis-of-caaf-decision-in-alil (July 
19, 2012) (explaining that Ali's case could not have been adjudicated under MEJA due to the textual exception of 
§3267's prohibition on trying host country nationals, like Ali, under the law). 
101 See United States v. Ali, 70 M.J. 514 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 20 II) which is the first recorded case in the record of 
Ali's prosecution. 
102 /d. at 517. 
103 /d.at514. 
104 Ali, 71 M.J. at 260. 
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This is problematic for a number of reasons. From a practical perspective, with no record of the 
court-martial, it is impossible to see if the process was expeditious or slow, efficient to 
adjudicate the crime, or bogged down by procedural difficulties. In theory, the court-martial, a 
more ad-hoc body and process, should be able to move expeditiously, but without any record, it 
is impossible to tell. Furthermore, though the due process protections of a court-martial are 
limited, there is no way to know if they were adhered to or not. They may well have been, but 
without a record, it is again, impossible to tell. Finally, given the novelty of the proceeding (the 
first court martial of a civilian under the Graham Amendment and likely the first at all since 
Averette), the lack of a record creates a knowledge deficit for both outsiders studying the case, 
and those military judges and attorneys that could learn from it. Nonetheless, from a 
prosecutorial perspective, it succeeded, as Ali was found guilty and confined for his crime. 
Additionally, there are concerns that the Appellate Court misapplied the facts in Ali 
concerning some of the longstanding language in 2(a)(10). Most questionable is the Appellate 
Court and the C.A.A.F.'s determination that Ali was ''in the field" during the incident with AI-
Umarryi. 105 The Judge (Erdman) writing the opinion for the C.A.A.F. correctly cited to Burney 
for the proposition that "in the field" means an area of actual fighting. 106 However, he wholly 
failed to substantiate that this was the area where the incident occurred. He cited to the 
(unreported) military judge's determination to that effect because the missions Ali was involved 
in required "mission preparations, safety brief, accountability, convoy to the mission site in up-
armored HMMWV s, training of Iraqi Police . . . [and] conduct[ing] patrols with the Iraqi 
police." 107 What the military and then Judge Erdman describes seems to be fairly standard 
precautionary procedures for operating in Iraq. Though he states, again without citation, that 
105 !d. at 264. 
106 !d. 
107 !d. 
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Ali's unit was stationed at a combat outpost subject to regular attacks, Judge Erdman fails to 
describe that the place where the assault on Al-Umarryi took place was an area of actual fighting, 
at the time of the assault. It may very well have been, but the posture Judge Erdman takes is 
unapologetically expansive. Under his determination, a history of combat could imply court-
martial jurisdiction over a civilian, even if the area was one of relative peace at the time. 
But even more disconcerting than the informational deficit from a lack of record or Judge 
Erdman's expansionist view of 2(a)(10), is that this prosecutorial victory was at the expense of 
constitutional principles reflected in the Toth Doctrine and at the expense of Ali's due process 
rights. With almost remarkable casualness Judge Erdman breezed through the questions of 
whether the Graham Amendment, as applied to Ali, violates the Constitution. 108 
Judge Erdman stated that there is a history of Supreme Court jurisprudence that denies 
aliens, as Ali is, the same constitutional protections that American citizens enjoy. 109 Judge 
Erdman cited these cases for the proposition that, unless aliens enter the United States, spend a 
significant amount of time in the country, and develop substantial connections with the country, 
they carmot enjoy the due process rights that citizens enjoy. 110 While mindful of the Toth 
Doctrine, he stated that the cases in that line of jurisprudence are distinguishable from Ali 
because they all involved American citizens, and not aliens. 111 This argument is deficient for 
three reasons. 
First, Judge Erdman too quickly determined that Ali does not have sufficient connections 
to the United States. Judge Erdman's statement that, "[n]either Ali's brief predeployment 
training at Fort Benning, Georgia, nor his employment with a United States corporation outside 
108 !d. at 269-270. 
109 United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. at 267 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950)). 
110 !d. 
111 !d. at 269. 
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the United States constitutes a 'substantial connection' with the United States as envisioned in 
Verdugo--Urquidez," is itself problematic for multiple reasons. 112 Though the tests are somewhat 
different ("sufficient nexus" vs. "substantial connection"), Ali's connections to the United States 
are at least as strong, if not stronger, than Brehm's. For the same reasons Brehm was deemed to 
have a sufficient nexus to the United States (mainly his employment by an American contractor 
doing business with the DoD during an American military operation) to justifY jurisdiction over 
him pursuant to MEJA, Ali has those connections as well. The statement is also problematic, 
because the constitutional rights at issue in Ali were the defendant's Fifth Amendment Due 
Process rights. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the rights in issue were the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure, which that Court distinguished from 
the rights protected by the Fifth Amendment. 113 Finally, to the extent that Verdugo- Urquidez is 
instructive, that court also made clear that a main reason the defendant in that case had no 
substantial connection to the United States was that his sole entrance into this country was 
involuntary, made only after he was arrested in Mexico and brought to the United States. 114 Ali 
on the other hand, as previously stated, had voluntarily entered the United States for 
predeployment training. 
The second constitutional problem with Judge Erdman's opinion is its misunderstanding 
of the Toth Doctrine and, accordingly, its unwarranted dismissal of the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Boumediene v. Bush. Judge Erdman stated, that although he is aware of Toth and the cases 
that follow it, they were inapplicable because they involved American citizens who "indisputably 
112 I d. 
113United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990). "Before analyzing the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment, we think it significant to note that it operates in a different manner than the Fifth Amendment, which is 
not at issue in this case. The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a 
fundamental trial right of criminal defendants." I d. at 264. 
114 I d. at 272-273. 
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enjoyed the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment."115 Though the citizens at issue in 
the Toth line of cases were American, not much was made of any distinction between their rights 
as Americans, and what those rights would have been if they were aliens. 
Nonetheless, even if Judge Erdman is accurate that the Toth Doctrine and its due process 
guarantees for civilians categorically did not used to apply to aliens, he fails to adequately 
confront how the 2006 ruling in Boumediene v. Bush changes this calculus. 116 Boumediene 
examined whether the government had the power to suspend the rights of inmates at the prison in 
Guantanamo Bay to have expedient Habeas Corpus proceedings. 117 In finding that the right to 
habeas could not be suspended in this situation, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, stated 
that "questions of extraterritoriality [in the application of constitutional rights] turn on objective 
factors and practical concerns, not formalism." 118 Practical concerns may have been an 
impediment to recognizing due process rights in Ali-though that is unlikely if the Supreme 
Court was willing to grant them to the "dangerous"119 Guantanamo inmates-but Judge Erdman 
fails to take them into consideration at all, relegating his analysis of Boumediene to an unhelpful 
footnote that fails to grapple with the core holding stated above. 120 Judge Erdman fails to 
correctly understand Toth, especially in light of Boumediene. 
Finally, Judge Erdman's majority opinion paid almost no attention to whether Congress, 
through the Graham Amendment, had the authority to grant the military court-martial 
jurisdiction over civilians for contingency operations, and not just formally declared wars as it 
previously had done. Judge Erdman stated that, "[ t ]he Supreme Court has cited Congress's 'war 
115 Ali, 71 M.J. at 269. 
116 See Vladeck, supra note I 00 (explaining that Boumediene changes the analysis on how Constitutional rights 
apply to aliens abroad). 
117 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
118 !d. at 764. 
119 !d. at 769. 
120 Ali, 71 M . .T ot 769, n. 75. 
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powers' as the constitutional source of authority and justification for federal court decisions 
which 'upheld military trial of civilians performing services for the armed forces 'in the field' 
during time of war,' citing to Reid v. Covert. 121 This argument is sweeping, and Judge Erdman 
acknowledged as much in a footnote. 122 He provided no meaningful explanation about why he is 
looking solely to a "War Powers" explanation for a case arising during a contingency operation 
and not a declared war. Contingency operations are categorically different from wars in both 
their designation and their character. 123 It cannot follow that Congress has the power to assert 
war powers over civilians during conflicts that are not by definition or the character, wars. 
It is also questionable whether Congress had the rulemaking authority pursuant to Article 
III of the Constitution, to pass the Graham Amendment in the first place, an issue that Judge 
Erdman totally failed to consider. Congress's rulemaking power allows it "to make rules for the 
government and regulation of the land and naval forces . . . ." 124 As Dionne notes, this 
rulemaking authority sets up a dichotomy: Congress has the power to regulate both civilians and 
the military, but to regulate them separately. There is no "hybrid" category that is part civilian, 
part military. 125 You are either one or the other. Depending on which category you belong to, 
the Fifth Amendment either guarantees you a jury trial or it does not. Civilians are guaranteed 
such jury trials and military members are not. 126 Ali, a civilian, is entitled to a jury trial pursuant 
to this credited understanding of the Rulemaking Authority and the Fifth Amendment The 
!21 !d. 
122 !d., no. 27. 
123 See Dionne, supra note 30, at 224-229 (explaining that contingency operations are designated so solely by the 
Secretary of Defense, and can range from combat operation like Operation Enduring Freedom, to humanitarian relief 
operations like those in .the former Yugoslavia, and civilian evacuation missions in Libya). 
124 U.S. CONST. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 14. 
125 See Dionne, supra note 30, at 224; But see Murphy v. Garrett, 729 F. Supp. 461,472-473 (W.D. Pa. 1990), for 
the proposition that military jurisdiction is less inttusive if a civilian is a reservist in the military. Judge Diamond 
did however quality that this holding is limited to the "peculiar facts of the instant suit" !d. at 473. 
126 See U.S. CONST. Amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in t..~e land or naval forces, or in the 
militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger .... "). 
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Graham Amendment is an unconstitutional exception to these longstanding rules. Judge Erdman 
failed, as he does in explaining the Amendment's language, and its relation to Toth and 
Boumediene, to reconcile the Amendment's provisions that empower the government to deny 
this right with its lack of conformity to generally understood Congressional rulemaking 
authority. 
To their credit, though they concurred with the result, two other C.A.A.F.judges wrestled 
with the Constitutional implications of the Graham Amendment in a significantly more strenuous 
fashion than Judge Erdman does. Chief Judge Baker, writing an opinion that concurred with the 
result, but for slightly different reasons, found that Congress did have authority to pass the 
Graham Amendment, but with more consideration of authority than Judge Erdman's belief that it 
did solely on the basis of their War Powers. 127 C.J. Baker, while circumspect about extending 
court-martial over civilians pursuant to the due process protections of the Fifth Amendment and 
the Supreme Court's caution as expressed through the Toth line, saw a combination of legal 
authorities providing the Constitutional basis for the Graham Amendment as it applied to Ali in 
the instant caseY8 Relying on a smattering of Congress's War Powers, Boumediene's call for a 
functional approach to the extension of Constitutional rights, and a tradition of a very limited use 
of court-martial over civilians during combat operations, C.J. Baker wrote that there was proper 
authority for the use of the Graham Amendment, "in this case, in this context."129 The authority 
comes from a combination of, "Rules and Regulations Clause, the War Powers, and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause."130 Thus, C.J. Baker held that the authority necessary to court-
127United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 272 (C.J. Baker concurring). 
128 Id. at 274-276. 
129 I d. at 276. 
1Jo Id. 
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martial Ali through a far more robust amalgamation of authority and m far narrower 
circumstances than Judge Erdman's opinion did. 
While C.J. Baker's concurrence is far more convincing than the majority's, it runs into 
similar constitutional problems. It fails to explicitly spell out that the circumstances involved 
warrant such an extreme departure (one the Supreme Court has been unwilling to give) from the 
typical understanding of Congress's Rulemaking power. Nowhere in the concurrence does it 
confront head-on the argument that the Graham Amendment was a congressional exercise of 
power that denies due process rights guaranteed civilians under the Fifth Amendment. C.J. 
Baker attempts to reconcile this by stating that Ali's due process rights under the court-martial 
were no different than those American servicemen and women would receive in their own 
potential court-martial. 131 But he fails to explicate why that matters, since Ali is clearly not an 
enlisted serviceman. 
The other concurrence, by Senior Judge Effron, comes even closer to hitting the right 
mark than either of the previous two opinions. For Judge Effron, the U.C.M.J.'s court-martial of 
Ali is constitutional only to the extent that Ali was not under MEJA's jurisdiction because of his 
designation of a host-country national, as a citizen of Iraq, working in Iraq. 132 Because there was 
no other jurisdiction to try Ali, his court-martial complied with the Toth Doctrine in that the 
Graham Amendment was being used to the "least possible power" because there was no other 
venue to do so. 133 Thus, essentially because there was no other option, court-martial jurisdiction 
was proper over Ali. 
While S.J. Effron's opinion comes closest to correctly interpreting Supreme Court law 
precedent in this area of jurisprudence, it does fail to take into account the full breadth of the 
131 !d. 
· 
132 United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 at 280-283 (S.J. Effron concurring). 
133 !d. at 280. 
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Toth Doctrine. As one scholar has pointed out, it particularly fails to reconcile the holding in Ex. 
Rel Guagliardo. 134 In that case, the Supreme Court disallowed court-martial jurisdiction over 
civilians abroad even though there was no other available forum to try them. 135 If the Court 
declined to exercise court-martial jurisdiction over civilians in Ex. Rel Guagliardo, it is unclear 
why the situation in Ali should be treated any differently. 
V. The Way Forward: Revisions To MEJA And The Graham Amendment That Would 
Increase Efficiency And Guarantee Constitutionality 
An analysis of the foregoing opinions has revealed attempts by Congress to resolve the 
problem of impunity for civilians serving with the military abroad, but also that Congress has 
created legislative schemes that raise serious legal concerns in doing so. With regards to MEJA, 
the problems are solely practical, and while practical issues exist with the Graham Amendment, 
the greater concerns are constitutional. Both must be resolved. Civilian impunity, especially as 
it relates to contractors, continues to be a problem in the Middle East whether the crimes 
committed are more banal 136 or more serious. 137 Fortunately, there are ways to reform both 
legislative schemes to increase their efficiency and constitutionality in an effort to ameliorate this 
problem consistent with this country's traditional legal values. 
With regards to MEJA, the statute itself must be revised to eliminate the proviSion 
excluding host -country nationals from its jurisdiction. In his concurrence, Judge Effron 
accurately states that this provision, "reflects congressional sensitivity to the interests of a host 
country in prosecuting its own citizens, an appropriate consideration under the military and 
134 See Vladeck, supra note 100. 
135 McElroy v. U.S. ex rei. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960). 
136 Cindy Galli, Rhonda Schwartz & Brian Ross, Exclusive: Video Shows Drunk, Stoned US Defense Contractors. 
ABC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-video-shows-drunk-stoned-us-security-contractors-
221702848--abc-news-topstories.html. 
137 Feds.: Defense Firm Put Untrained Guards in Iraq, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://seatt1etimes.com/htrnVnationworld/20 19567982 _ apusdefensecontractorlawsuit.html. 
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foreign affairs powers of Congress."138 However, this purpose is independently satisfied by a 
different provision of MEJA, which precludes the United States from prosecuting a civilian if the 
foreign government, with jurisdiction recognized by the United States (as Iraq would have had 
over Ali), has first started doing so. 139 So long as the Justice Department was careful to make 
sure that the host country had the first opportunity to prosecute civilian wrongdoers, it would 
likely be able to assuage Judge Effron's concern without generally precluding their ability to 
ever prosecute host country nationals. 
In addition to revising this statutory language, Congress should also pass the Civilian 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA). CEJA was introduced by the House in the !lOth 
Congress, and was passed there, but the Senate failed to do so as well and since then little has 
been done to reignite its potential passage. 140 Its purpose is to bring more non-DoD employed 
contractors under the jurisdiction of the American Federal Courts. 141 For example, because 
MEJA requires that the civilian's employment, "relates to supporting the mission of the 
Department of Defense overseas" if a contractor is implied by another Federal agency with no 
connections to the DoD, MEJA will not provide jurisdiction. 142 Thus, if a contractor's 
employment supports another agency's mission overseas, such as the State Department's or 
CIA's, the civilian will fall into the "jurisdiction gap."143 The effect of this restriction is to create 
cases that focus on the minutiae of a contractor employee's designation, in effect making, 
"[ c ]ases that would otherwise be straightforward can tum into complex investigations focusing 
not just on the underlying criminal conduct, but also on the scope of the defendant's 
138 United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256,280 (S.J. Effron concurring) (citing H.R. REP. 106-778). 
139 18 U.S.C. 326l(b) (2006). 
14° Charles Doyle, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42358, CIVILIAN EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT: FEDERAL 
CONTRACTOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY OVERSEAS (2012). 
141 Id 
142 18 u.s.c. 3267 (2006). 
143 See Dionne, supra note 30, at 222. 
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employment, his or her specific work duties, and other jurisdiction-related facts." 144 That this 
employment information can be classified and difficult for the Justice Department to obtain 
makes the specter of civilian impunity even more daunting. 145 
CEJA would close this jurisdictional gap and provide for jurisdiction regardless of which 
agency's mission the civilian is supporting. 146 It would also provide greater oversight of such 
prosecutions. 147 CEJA has the support of the Justice Department, State Department, at least one 
non-governmental organization, and contractors themselves. 148 At a time when the military is 
drawing down its numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan, and increasing the numbers of contractors it 
uses, 149 it is imperative to have a Constitutional and efficient statutory scheme in place to 
adjudicate potential crimes they commit. The above-mentioned revision to MEJA, as well as the 
enactment and implementation of CEJA would provide that scheme. 
The constitutional infirmities that face the Graham Amendment are not so easily resolved 
by congressional action. As judges, scholars, and legal bloggers have noted, fundamental issues 
of Congress's ability to pass this law, as well as the military's ability to deny due process rights 
are implicated. 150 Nonetheless, looking to the Toth line provides some indication of how the 
Graham Amendment, may be salvaged and used in a limited fashion. In particular, McElroy 
provides an insight into how the military may use the Graham Amendment in a Constitutional 
fashion going forward. 
144 See Statement of Lanny Breuer, supra note 64, at 4. 
145 !d. at 4-5. 
146 Id. 
147 The Case for the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA): Why U.S. Needs to ClarifY U.S. Criminal 
Jurisdiction Over U.S. Contractors Fielded Abroad, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (last visited Jan. 16, 2013) 
http://www.humanrightsflrst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfi'CEJA-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
148 !d. at 2. 
149 !d. 
150 See opinions ofC.J. Baker, S.J. Effron, the Dionne article, and Vladeck's blog-post supra at 128, 133, 30 and 101 
respectively 
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As stated above, McElroy stands for the Toth proposition that the use of court-martial be 
"limited to the least possible power."151 It did, however, see a Constitutional way to submit 
military employees, who would traditionally be thought of as civilians, to the jurisdiction of the 
court-martial. To do so it offers the example of paymasters in the Navy.152 Essentially, during 
the Revolutionary War, because the job of the paymasters were thought to be of such vital 
importance to the war effort, and any criminal disputes involving them were in need of expedient 
resolution, people in that position essentially signed a waiver that granted the Navy jurisdiction 
over them for the duration of the conflict. 153 For that period, they would be enlisted into the 
American military and be held to court-martial jurisdiction.154 
A similar scheme to this could be utilized by the American military. For those 
contractors over whom it would want to potentially have court-martial jurisdiction, the military 
could require a waiver of a jury trial, which would include a notice that they have received, read, 
and understand that if they commit a crime, could be court-martialed pursuant to 2(a)(10). The 
Supreme Court has never ruled directly on whether a jury trial waiver so far in advance of 
litigation in a criminal trial would be valid and legally enforceable. Generally, Courts are 
circumspect about waivers. To protect the person waiving Constitutional Rights, Courts have 
held that "in the civil no less than the criminal area, 'courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver."' 155 Furthermore, "[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must 
be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences."156 These holdings could present some difficulty in the 
151 McElroy, 361 U.S. at 286. 
152 I d. at 284-285. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) quoting, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389,393 (1937). 
156 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) 
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contractor context. If these waivers were to be ruled valid and enforceable, they could not be 
merely included in the contracts signed by contractors; they would have to be adequately 
explained to the contractor by a member of the company's human resources or legal department. 
Another obstacle is that many of these contractors speak little or no English. Thus, the waiver, 
and the explanation would have to be in the contractor's native language to be understood, and 
thus, valid and enforceable. However, if those requirements could be accommodated, the 
contractor may be able to validly waive his or her right to a trial by jury as a term of 
employment. 
Additionally, this scheme could only be used, pursuant to the Toth line "to the least 
possible power," and thus only in situations where prosecution under MEJA and CEJA would be 
impractical (thus also satisfYing Boumediene). In order to determine whether the use of court-
martial satisfies both Toth and Boumediene, the courts should employ a "totality of the 
circumstances" test. 
Totality of the circumstances tests are ubiquitous in American legal jurisprudence. They 
are used in everything from Fourth Amendment cases 157 to cases involving the discharge of 
student loans. 158 They seek to create a proper legal determination on a given case after 
reviewing a number of deliberative balancing factors. To create a totality of the circumstances 
test for the current problem, courts should consider factors that reveal whether the use of court-
martial violates Toth and is being used more than for the "least possible power" necessary, as 
well as if the court-martial is being used in violation of Boumediene for reasons other than to 
• avoid severe impracticability. Such factors to evaluate these circumstances could be, but are not 
limited to: (1) the context in which the contractor signed the notice and waiver described above, 
157 Christo Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1171, 1172 (2007). 
158 Julie Swedback & Kelly Prettner, Discharge or No Discharge? An Overview of Eighth Circuit Jurisprudence in 
Student Loan Discharge Cases, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1679, 1680 (2010). 
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and whether it was willingly with adequate knowledge, rather than coercive; (2) the complexity 
of the investigation and whether, because of sensitive timing issues with regards to evidence, 
whether the Justice Department may not be able to expediently provide the necessary resources 
(3) whether the military can substitute for the Justice Department and adequately provide such a 
timely and robust investigation; and (4) whether necessity calls for an expedient resolution of the 
case to restore morale to the local population or the military unit affected. 
The combination of a knowledgeable and informed waiver and an incisive totality of the 
circumstances test would ensure that the Graham Amendment is used in a way that is consistent 
with longstanding (Toth) and recent (Boumediene) precedent seeking to ensure that the due 
process rights of civilians are not violated. Unfortunately, it would not obviate the concern 
expressed above that Congress did not have the authority in the first place to pass the Graham 
Amendment. 159 Nonetheless, it would go very far in ensuring that the courts do not over-utilize a 
procedure that is supposed to be exceedingly limited in these circumstances, especially when 
there is a concurrent legislative scheme that provides for similar adjudication. 
VI. Conclusion 
The problem dealt with by this Comment is relatively new in its pervasiveness, but the 
legal issues surrounding it are as old as our republic. The problem of jurisdiction over civilians 
working with the military abroad went on for far too long without resolution. The lack of 
regulation of these people led to crimes under this country's flag that, because of legal failures, 
could not be adequately resolved by the United States. Doubtlessly, this affected our reputation 
as a country that upholds justice, both on these missions abroad and at home. 
Those that threw in their lot and passed MEJA and the Graham Amendment should be 
commended for their willingness to tackle a problem, that if allowed to go on, would further 
159 See Dionne, supra note 30, at 223-237. 
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sully our reputation, and more importantly, stand in the way of delivering justice. Nonetheless, 
in their haste to resolve this issue, they failed to carefully consider the effects of the laws that 
they were passing. The cases of Sean Brehm and Ala Mohammed Ali display how both MEJA 
and the Graham Amendment were capable of achieving successful prosecutions, but they also 
revealed serious flaws in these dual schemes. Legal innovation is often important, and here it is 
necessary, but it can never come at the expense of our Constitutional principles. The proposals 
outlined above would go a significant way to eliminating the practical and legal problems they 
present, while hopefully, allowing for increased utilization and prosecutions of civilians who 
commit crimes while working for our military. 
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